At a glance
- Foreclosures are up from 17% last year, landing harder than in any year since 2022.
- For advisors and allocators underwriting bridge funds, a loan that misses the payoff bucket can sit in special servicing close to 40 months before a foreclosure completes.
- Trepp puts $71.7 billion of CMBS debt in special servicing as of October 2026, five times the October 2019 level.
Modifications accounted for 37% of the balance that left CMBS special servicing in 2026 through October, down from 54% in 2024, according to Trepp.
Foreclosures are up from 17% last year, landing harder than in any year since 2022. Trepp said the drop in modifications marks the end of a three-year bet that rates would fall.
For advisors and allocators underwriting bridge funds, a loan that misses the payoff bucket can sit in special servicing close to 40 months before a foreclosure completes. Payoffs, the cleanest exit, were 24% of resolved balance this year, up from 11% in 2023. Clean cures fell to 16% from 24% in 2022.
Trepp puts $71.7 billion of CMBS debt in special servicing as of October 2026, five times the October 2019 level. Of that balance, 43% has been there two years or more, up from 28% at the end of 2024. Foreclosures take longest to clear.
The research sits between two Federal Reserve papers that reach opposite conclusions from the same data on the largest banks. New York Fed economists Matteo Crosignani and Saketh Prazad found that weakly capitalized banks extended distressed commercial real estate loans to protect their capital ratios. The pattern was strongest at the largest banks. A Federal Reserve Board study by David Glancy, using the same data, concluded instead that after the 2023 bank stress banks demanded bigger paydowns for extensions, and that those loans performed well.
CMBS data separate the two mechanisms. Special servicers have no capital ratio to protect, yet their extensions still surged. That supports Glancy's account of lenders riding out a temporary shock. The shock did not pass, and redefaults and losses followed, supporting Crosignani and Prazad on extensions storing up losses for later.
Trepp revised its June view. It argued then that "extend and pretend" was too blunt a description of CRE maturity stress, and that extending was a reasonable bet on lower rates rather than simply a way to hide losses. In CMBS, Trepp now says, that bet is losing.
Payoffs rose as modifications and clean cures fell
Share of CMBS balance leaving special servicing, each type's baseline year vs 2026 (%)
- Earlier year
- 2026
- Modifications, 202454 → 37
- Payoffs, 202311 → 24
- Clean cures, 202224 → 16
Show as table
| Item | Earlier year | 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modifications, 2024 | 54 | 37 | −17 |
| Payoffs, 2023 | 11 | 24 | +13 |
| Clean cures, 2022 | 24 | 16 | −8 |
A third installment tests the paydown finding
In November, Trepp flagged refinancing at higher rates as the forward risk for bank CRE books, as Private Wealth Daily previously reported. Part 3 of the series will test Glancy's paydown finding against CMBS loans, where the paydown terms borrowers accepted to win an extension are visible in the loan documents rather than inferred from bank capital ratios.
Reported by the Real estate debt desk from Trepp — Research and Private Wealth Daily archive. Published . Corrections